Background
Migration Model Background
The Australia Migration Model (TAMM) sits on a simple idea: migration policy works best
when selection and capacity move together.
Australia migration snapshot
Early 2026 reference frame
These figures combine the latest available ABS population releases, Home Affairs visa
stock data, and education-sector counts. Some categories are official point-in-time counts;
others are benchmarks where no current quarterly stock is published.
National migration and citizenship snapshot
| Category | Number | Share / Notes |
| Total population | 27.7 million | ABS Estimated Resident Population at 30 September 2025. |
| Overseas-born | 8.8 million | 32.0% of the population at 30 June 2025. |
| Australian-born residents | 18.8 million | ABS country-of-birth count. This is not the same thing as Australian citizenship. |
| Australian citizens | 2021 benchmark: ~22.0-22.7 million | The Migration Review's rounded chart implies about 22.0m; Wilson et al.'s PLIDA/Census model estimates 22.68m. No current quarterly citizen stock is published. |
| Non-citizen permanent residents | Latest benchmark: about 1.5 million in 2021 | The Migration Review and Wilson et al. both sit around 1.5-1.52m. Current PR stock is not published as a simple quarterly series. |
| Non-citizen temporary residents | ~2.97 million | Home Affairs temporary visa holder stock at 31 March 2026, including New Zealand citizens and temporary entrants present in Australia. |
| International students | 551,717 | Students studying in Australia in January 2026, not enrolments or all student-visa holders. |
| Working Holiday Makers | ~237,000 | Subclass 417 and 462 visa holders in the March 2026 temporary visa stock. |
Net Overseas Migration (NOM) 2024-25: 306,000.
That is down from 429,000 in 2023-24 and a financial-year peak of about 538,000 in
2022-23.
Top population centres
| Rank | City | Population | % of total population |
| 1 | Sydney | ~5.64 million | 20.4% |
| 2 | Melbourne | ~5.44 million | 19.7% |
| 3 | Brisbane | ~2.83 million | 10.3% |
| Combined | Sydney + Melbourne + Brisbane | ~50.4% |
Source reconciliation
Some source numbers differ because they measure different things.
The Wilson, Temple, Bernard and Siriban paper is useful for model structure, but many of
its numerical tables are 2021 base estimates or illustrative five-year projections. TAMM's
headline figures use later ABS, Home Affairs, Budget, housing, and education releases
where available.
Why the academic-model figures do not always match TAMM's snapshot
| Topic | Wilson et al. paper | TAMM | How to read it |
| Total population | 25.69m in the 2021 projection base | 27.7m at 30 September 2025 | Wilson et al. start from a 2021 model base. TAMM's snapshot uses the latest ABS ERP release. |
| Citizen and PR stock | 22.68m citizens; 1.52m PRs in 2021 | ~22.0-22.7m citizens; ~1.5m PRs as 2021 benchmarks | These are benchmark stock estimates, not live administrative series. The citizen range reflects different rounded/PLIDA-based sources. |
| Temporary population | 0.35m students, 0.49m other temporary, 0.64m NZ citizens in 2021 | ~2.97m temporary visa holders and NZ citizens at 31 March 2026 | Different date and definition. TAMM uses a current Home Affairs visa-holder stock, not the paper's 2021 PLIDA projection categories. |
| Permanent program | 185k Migration Program plus 20k Humanitarian Program in the Main scenario | 185k permanent Migration Program places | TAMM's permanent-place lever excludes the Humanitarian Program. The paper combines Migration and Humanitarian programs in its scenario assumptions. |
| NOM forward path | 187k annual average NOM in 2026-31 under its Main scenario | Budget forecasts: 295k in 2025-26, 245k in 2026-27, then 225k | The paper's figures are five-year illustrative scenario averages. TAMM uses the latest Budget forecasts. |
NOM and pressure
NOM is a net flow, not the total arrival count.
Net Overseas Migration is arrivals minus departures. That is useful for housing and
infrastructure because it measures the durable change in the resident population, but it
also hides the gross movement underneath.
NOM arithmetic and return-flow context
| Measure | Number | How to read it |
| Migrant arrivals, 2024-25 | 568,000 | People who arrived and met the ABS migration residence rule. |
| Migrant departures, 2024-25 | 263,000 | People who left Australia for long enough to leave the usually resident population. |
| Net Overseas Migration | 306,000 | Arrivals less departures, rounded by ABS. |
| NOM share of resident population | ~1.1% | 305,600 divided by the June 2025 Estimated Resident Population of 27.6 million. |
| Illustrative 350,000 NOM | ~1.26% | 350,000 divided by 27.7 million. The arithmetic is right; the label is NOM share, not total population growth. |
| Australians living overseas | ~1 million | A broad government guidance estimate, not a live register or a forecast of return migration. |
The return-right nuance matters.
Australian citizens can return to Australia. Permanent residents can usually live in
Australia indefinitely, but Home Affairs is explicit that re-entry from overseas depends
on a valid travel facility or a Resident Return visa. There is no clean current public
count of "citizens plus PRs overseas who can return tomorrow". The practical point is
not to add the whole offshore pool to NOM; it is that return waves can change arrivals
during shocks and will enter NOM if people stay long enough.
There is no official "healthy" NOM share.
As a planning rule of thumb, below 1% of population is easier to absorb; 1.0-1.5% can be
workable when housing, infrastructure, schools, health services, and skills systems keep
pace; around 1.8-2.0% is a high-pressure setting unless the supply response is unusually
strong. Social absorption is not just a percentage: source-region mix, language pathways,
labour-market matching, local institutions, and housing confidence all matter.
Model logic
Selection and capacity have to move together.
Migration can lift Australia's workforce, tax base, and export income. It can also add
pressure when housing, recognition systems, and city infrastructure fail to keep pace.
The benefit side
A well-selected permanent program can raise labour supply, fill specific skills gaps, add
tax revenue, and support export industries such as international education. Treasury's
long-run modelling is useful here because it separates fiscal and GDP effects by migrant
stream rather than treating every arrival as identical.
The simulator therefore gives weight to skilled-primary places and faster recognition of
overseas qualifications. That does not imply family migration has no value; it keeps the
measurable economic channel separate from social, humanitarian, and community goals.
Fiscal NPV and cohorts
NPV means net present value: a future stream of taxes paid and services used, converted
into today's dollars. A cohort is the group being assessed together. Here, the permanent
cohort means one annual permanent-program intake.
The formula is deliberately transparent: weighted lifetime fiscal value per
migrant multiplied by permanent places. The weighted value uses the skilled-primary share,
an assumed skilled-secondary share inside the Skill stream, and the remaining Family
stream share.
The pressure side
Population growth becomes politically and economically fragile when it outruns housing
delivery or concentrates heavily in already constrained cities. A national fiscal dividend
can coexist with renters facing a local supply shock.
The model translates NOM into an estimated dwelling requirement and compares that with an
annual homes-completed lever. It also treats student load, capital-city concentration, and
total volume as pressure signals.
NOM, tourists, and temporary visas
Net overseas migration is not the same as border crossings. ABS uses the 12/16-month rule,
so a temporary visa holder can count if they become a usual resident for migration
measurement, while a short tourist visit does not count.
This matters because NOM is the simulator's population-pressure lever. It captures durable
residence change, not every border crossing.
Visa pathways and bottlenecks
Migration is a stock-flow system, not a set of separate pipes. Students can move to
graduate or other temporary visas, temporary skilled workers can move to permanent
residence, permanent residents can become citizens, and some people leave before any of
that happens.
That matters because a smaller permanent program does not automatically mean less
temporary pressure. If many people are already onshore and fewer permanent places are
available, more people may remain temporary for longer. TAMM does not run a full
multistate projection, but it treats student arrivals, permanent places, skills use, and
NOM as linked assumptions rather than moral labels.
Onshore, offshore, and the PR milestone
Permanent residence is not always the final step of a long onshore visa path. In
2024-25, Home Affairs recorded 101,022 Migration Program outcomes for people who were
in Australia at the time of application and 83,979 for people outside Australia. That is
roughly a 55/45 split overall, with the Skill stream more onshore and the Family stream
more offshore.
The distinction is important: location at application is not the same as a full life
history. Some offshore applicants may have lived in Australia before, and some onshore
applicants may have short or unusual pathways. But it confirms the basic point: permanent
residence is neither all brand-new arrivals nor all people converting from temporary visas.
From a NOM and housing-pressure perspective, that split matters. Onshore applicants are
usually already living somewhere, spending money, and often working or paying tax before
the permanent visa is granted. Offshore applicants are more likely to create a new arrival
and settlement event, although the timing is not identical to the grant date. Permanent
and provisional visa grant material includes a specified first-entry arrival date, and
Home Affairs guidance for offshore permanent visas commonly describes that date as
generally 12 months from grant. The practical lag between grant and arrival can be
meaningful: 6-9 months is a plausible scenario assumption, not an official average. From
a broad housing-pressure perspective this mostly shifts timing rather than changing the
multi-year demand total.
In the lived migration journey, permanent residence is often the main milestone. It
usually resolves the hardest uncertainty: the right to remain indefinitely, build a life,
work and study, access Medicare, and later apply for citizenship if eligible. Citizenship
by conferral still requires an application, residence eligibility, character checks, and
usually a test and ceremony. For many settled permanent residents, though, it is more of a
formal capstone than the main selection contest.
International education exports
ABS records education-related travel exports as an annual balance-of-payments value. The
$53.6B baseline is an economy-wide annual export number for 2024-25. It includes $23.5B
in tuition fees and $29.9B in goods and services.
The denominator is the active student stock, not new arrivals. The Department of Education
counted 551,717 international students studying in Australia in January 2026, which makes
the baseline roughly $97k per active student per year. The student lever uses a dampened
relationship, because a change in new arrivals does not instantly resize the whole sector.
Stress testing the settings
At low NOM and high building rates, the simulator tends to show capacity improving faster
than demand. At very high NOM, even a strong skills mix can be overwhelmed by housing and
city pressure unless construction also lifts.
These settings are not predictions. They show which assumptions are carrying a scenario,
and where the trade-off changes direction.
What this is not
This is not a full macroeconomic model, a population forecast, or a ranking of visa
categories. It is a transparent policy simulator designed to expose trade-offs and make
the assumptions easy to challenge.
It also does not score cultural change. Migration can enrich national life and strengthen
communities, but culture, identity, and social cohesion are not well represented by a
single numeric slider. TAMM keeps those questions separate from the measurable economic
and capacity channels.